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Vaknin, Sam, 1961-

"Crime and Corruption"

Arab traders used it to avoid being
robbed on the Silk Road. Cheating is punished by effective ex-
communication and "loss of honour" - the equivalent of an economic
death sentence. Physical violence is rarer but not unheard of.
Violence sometimes also erupts between money recipients and robbers
who are after the huge quantities of physical cash sloshing about
the system. But these, too, are rare events, as rare as bank
robberies. One result of this effective social regulation is that
commodity traders in Asia shift hundreds of millions of US dollars
per trade based solely on trust and the verbal commitment of their
counterparts.
Hawala arrangements are used to avoid customs duties, consumption
taxes, and other trade-related levies. Suppliers provide importers
with lower prices on their invoices, and get paid the difference via
Hawala. Legitimate transactions and tax evasion constitute the bulk
of Hawala operations. Modern Hawala networks emerged in the 1960's
and 1970's to circumvent official bans on gold imports in Southeast
Asia and to facilitate the transfer of hard earned wages of
expatriates to their families ("home remittances") and their
conversion at rates more favourable (often double) than the
government's.

Hawala provides a cheap (it costs c. 1% of the amount transferred),
efficient, and frictionless alternative to morbid and corrupt
domestic financial institutions.


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