Now, the basis of this old concept of his
regarding the reality of universal ideas was that the same quality
formed the essence alike of the abstract whole and of the
individuals which were its parts: in other words, that there could
be no essential differences among these individuals, all being
alike save for such variety as might grow out of the many accidents
of existence. Thereafter, however, he corrected this opinion, no
longer maintaining that the same quality was the essence of all
things, but that, rather, it manifested itself in them through
diverse ways. This problem of universals is ever the most vexed one
among logicians, to such a degree, indeed, that even Porphyry,
writing in his "Isagoge" regarding universals, dared not attempt a
final pronouncement thereon, saying rather: "This is the deepest of
all problems of its kind." Wherefore it followed that when William
had first revised and then finally abandoned altogether his views
on this one subject, his lecturing sank into such a state of
negligent reasoning that it could scarce be called lecturing on the
science of dialectics at all; it was as if all his science had been
bound up in this one question of the nature of universals.
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