He had one detachment of Imperial Service troops officered by Punjabis,
and a certain force of Kashmir Sepoys who made ineffective policemen,
and as soldiers were worse than useless. And with them he had to defend
the valley, and hold the native town, which might give trouble on his
flank. This was the most vexatious part of the business. If Marker had
organized the thing, then nothing could be unexpected, and treachery was
sure to be thick around them.
The men came, saluted, and waited in silence. Thwaite sat down at a
table and pulled a sheaf of telegraph forms to pieces. First he wired
to Ladcock at Gilgit, beseeching reinforcements. From Bardur to the
south there is only one choice of ways--by Yasin and Yagistan to the
Indus Valley, or by Gilgit and South Kashmir. Once beyond Gilgit there
was small hope of checking an advance, but in case the shorter way to
the Indus by the Astor Valley was tried there might be hope of a delay.
So he besought Ladcock to post men on the Mazeno Pass if the time was
given him. Then he sent a like message to Yasin, though on the high
passes and the unsettled country there was small chance of the wires
remaining uncut. A force in Yasin might take on the flank any invasion
from Afghanistan and in any case command the Chitral district. Then
came a series of frantic wires at random--to Rawal Pindi, to the Punjabi
centres, to South Kashmir.
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